Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2018

OREM CITY, Appellee v. BRIDGETTE CHATWIN, Appellant. : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nathan E. Burdsal, Hutch U. Fale; attorneys for appellant.
D. Jacob Summers; attorney for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Orem v. Chatwin, No. 20180006 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2018).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4029

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

,
OREM CITY,
Appellee

RESPONSE BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE

V.

Appeal No. 20180006
BRIDGETTE CHA'fWIN,
Appellant.

Nathan E. Burdsal (USB 11034)
Hutch U. Fale (USB 11189)
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC
1979 N 1120 W
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 788-4122
Facsimile (801) 705-0606
Attorneys for Appellant

D. Jacob Summers (USB 12253)
City of Orem
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (80l) 229-7097
F.acsimile: (801) 229-7302
Attorney for Appellee

FJLEO
UTAH APPELLATf: COUBTS

OCT 1 t. 2018
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vJ

~

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
v,

OREM CITY,
Appellee

vi

RESPONSE BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE

V.

Appeal No. 20180006
BRIDGETTE CHATWIN,
Appellant.

~

~

~

Nathan E. Burdsal (USB 11034)
Hutch U. Fale (USB 11189)
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC
1979 N 1120 W
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (80 I) 788-4122
Facsimile (80 I) 705-0606
Attorneys for Appellant

D. Jacob Summers (USB 12253)
City of Orem
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 229-7097
Facsimile: (801) 229-7302
Attorney for Appellee

~

~

vi)

I.cl)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
RESPONSE BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE

Appellee

Appeal No. 20180006
BRIDGETTE CHATWIN,
Appellant.

Nathan E. Burdsal (USB 11034)
Hutch U. Fale (USB 11189)
A VERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC
1979 N 1120 W
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 788-4122
Facsimile (801) 705-0606
Attorneys for Appellant

VP

D. Jacob Summers (USB 12253)
City of Orem
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 229-7097
Facsimile: (801) 229-7302
Attorney for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PARTIES

This is an appeal from a criminal proceeding. The Appellant/Defendant is the
accused, Ms. Bridgette Chatwin ("Chatwin"), and is represented by Nathan E. Bursdal
and Hutch U. Fale. Ms. Chatwin was represented at the trial level by appointed counsel,
Grant C. Nagamatsu. Orem City ("the City") is the Appellee/Prosecutor and is
represented by D. Jacob Summers.
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INTRODUCTION

Appellant seeks to set aside her conviction of a class A misdemeanor, Trespass of
a Dwelling. In seeking this remedy, she asserts that she was denied effective assistance
of counsel and challenges the jury's verdict on grounds of insufficient evidence.
However, the request to set aside the conviction is improperly marshaled and briefed.
The record supports the professional competence of her trial counsel.
Appellant fails to "marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings
-----...rn-.4--+\.ri~rhn~n-r+.......+ic:r+l~-a,-.,,zn,--,-rn:rrrnm"TI'-rl-n-,-tWl:trln'Yk-t-~~-f½-TT7'\1~hi-~Fko~~rk.5-tnnr----~~

and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below,

the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738
(UT App. 1990). The record provides sufficient evidence, with reasonable inferences, to
support the jury's verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1

Does trial counsel's decision not to file a Motion to Dismiss for unconstitutional
delay constitute performance which falls below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgement, where his ciient previously delayed the case through
continuances and her failure to appear at multiple hearings, delayed the trial setting at her
request, never asserted her speedy trial right, and was not prejudiced by the City's delay?
Standard of Review:

"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law." State v. Ott, 2010 UT I,

ii 16, 247 P.2d 344. To prevail, a

defendant must show: ( l) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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~

reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have
obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,r 6, 89 P.3d 162.
\@

Appellant "must overcome the 'strong presumption that [her] trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance' by persuading the court that there was no 'conceivable tactical basis

for counsel's actions"'. Id. (quoting State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) and
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). (emphasis in original) (internal
citations omitted). The Court should give "trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical
decisions and [ ] not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis
supporting them." Id. (quoting Crosby, 927 P.2d at ,r 644).
Issue 2

Should the Court reverse a jury's verdict, where the jury acting as fact-finder,
weighed the credibility of witnesses and the conflicting testimonies, believed the
testimony of one witness over that of others, and the testimony presented evidence, with
reasonable inferences, sufficient to support a guilty verdict?
Standard of Review

The applicable standard of review is "highly deferential." State v. Nielsen, 2014
UT 10,

,r 30, 326 P.3d 645.

In reviewing "a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, [the

Court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Maestas, 2012
~

UT 46,

,r 302, 299 P.3d 892 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court will reverse

"only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
~
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committed the crime of which he or she was convicted." Id.

The Court does "not

examine whether [it] believe[s] that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Garcia-Meiia, 2017 UT App 129, il 12,402 P.3d 82 (quoting
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ~ 18, 10 P.3d 346).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Procedural History of Case
On June 17, 2016, the City of Orem filed an Information charging Appellant with
Trespass, a Class A Misdemeanor. (Appellant Addendum #2, Appellee Addendum #1).
On July 17, 2016, Appellant signed a promise to appear for an arraignment. (Appellant
Addendum #2, Appellee Addendum #1). On August 3, 2016, Appellant appeared in the
Orem Justice Court, was appointed a public defender and requested a continuance.
(Appellee Addendum #1). On September 19, 2016, Appellant requested a continuance of
the pre-trial conference. (Id.) On November 2, 2016, Defendant failed to appear. Trial
counsel rescheduled pre-trial conference to December 12, 2016. (Id.) On December 12,
2016, defendant failed to appear for the pre-trial conference. (Id.) Appellant did not
appear in the Orem Justice Court until March 13, 2017.

(Id.)

On March 13, 2017,

Appellant scheduled a bench trial for June 5, 2017. (Id.) During that time, trial counsel
and the City attempted to reach a plea agreement. In April 2017, Branson Tanner, one of
the City's witnesses, moved to France for an ecclesiastical mission. (R. 266: 15-19). On
June 5, 2017, unable to reach a negotiated resolution, the City voluntarily dismissed the
case, stating that the case was to be refiled in the district court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On July 17, 2017, the City refiled the Information in the Fourth District Court Spanish Fork Department. (R. 2-3). The City served the summons on July 23, 2017,
instructing the Appellant to appear on August 25, 2017 at 9:30 am. (R. 5-7). On August
25, 2017, Appellant failed to appear at the hearing, and a warrant issued for her arrest.
(R. 8-12).

On August 28, 2017, Appellant signed a promise to appear for a review of

the bench warrant/ Initial Appearance. (R. 13-14). On September 1, 2017, Appellant
appeared, appointed trial counsel, and the matter was scheduled for a waiver hearing.· (R.
16-17).

On September 29, 2017, Appellant requested a jury trial. (R. 24). Appellant

consented to the trial date of December 6, 201 7. (Id.) On November 17, 201 7, Appellant
failed to appear for her final pre-trial conference.

(R. 28). On November 21,-2017,

Appellant appeared at the rescheduled final pre-trial conference. (R. 31 ).
On December 6, 2017, Appellant was present, a jury was impaneled, and the case
was tried. (R. 100-105). At trial, a potential witness was not subpoenaed, due to the fact
that he was living out of the country. (R. 266: 15-19). The jury returned a guilty verdict,
vii

on the sole count of Criminal Trespass of a Dwelling. (R. 99). Appellant waived time
for sentencing, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant the same day. (R. 103-04).
Facts of the Case
On May 28, 2016, Appellant and her brother drove to Tanner residence.

(R.

332:7-10, 17). The Tanner residence is located in Orem, Utah. (R. 304: 16-19). The
~

Appellant's brother went to the front door of the residence. (R. 333:25-334:3; 336:22-25).
At that time, Mr. Johnny Tanner and his son, Branson, were home alone. (R. 266:7-14).
Mr. Tanner and his son were upstairs. (R. 266:24). Mr. Tanner heard a knock at the

~
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door, and he came out of his bedroom and stood at the top of the stairwell. (R. 268: i 023 ). Mr. Tanner's son responded that he would answer the door. (R. 269:4). Mr. Tanner
had no visual obstruction of the front door and entry way. (R. 270:14-15). When Mr.
Tanner's son opened the door, an unknown male came through the domway and
immediately start swinging, punching, Branson Tanner. (R. 271: 15-18). This unknown
male was taller than Mr. Tanner, and a heavier build. (R. 272: 1-2). The male was double
the size of Mr. Tanner's son.. (R. 300:1). The assault quickly moved into the home,
through the entryway, into the kitchen/dining room, back to the back wall/sliding glass
door of the home. (R. 272:5-8; R. 274:13-17; R. 276). Mr. Tanner's son was on the
ground, with the unknown male on top, continuing the assault. (R. 276: 16-R. 277 :5).
Mr. Tanner pulled the unknown male off of his son. (R. 277:7-10). As Mr. Tanner did
this, he realized that a second unknown person had entered his home. (R. 277-18-22).
This unknown person was pulling on him. (R. 277:20-22). This second unknown person
was the Appellant. (R. 287:4-16).
At this point, Mr. Tanner had an unknown male assailant in his home, and this
second unknown person pulling on him. (R. 278:12-17). Mr. Tanner was concerned that
if he didn't get these unknown persons out of his home "something really terrible was
going to happen." (R. 278:20-21). Mr. Tanner was concerned for his safety, the safety of
his son, and the safety of his family if they returned in that moment. (R. 278: 19-24, R.
300:9-18).
Once Mr. Tanner had stopped the assault, he wanted to get the two unknown
individuals out of his home.

(R. 278: 19-14). In order to get the Appellant and her

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law5Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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brother to leave his home, he "threatened them quite strong." (R. 278: 19). Mr. Tanner
asked the Appellant to leave the home. (R. 302 8-12). After being ordered to leave the
home, the Appellant remained in the home, exchanging words with Mr. Tanner. (R.
298:15-19). The Appellant was quite loud and boisterous. (R. 278:23). Mr. Tanner and
(JP

Appellant "had words." (R. 278:24). For some time, 30-45 seconds, Appellant engaged
in an argument with Mr. Tanner in the dining room of the Tanner home. (R. 298:7-23).
The Appellant continued to exchange words with Mr. Tanner, while he moved the group
from the back of the home out the front door.

(R. 302:3-12).

Mr. Tanner had to

forcefully push them out of his home. (R. 279:12-24).
After ·Mr. Tanner removed the Appellant and her brother from his home, he called
the police. (R 282:15). Officer Grazzini responded to the police call. (R. 285:3-6).
After speaking with the-'parties and investigating the call, Officer Grazzini cited the
Appellant with Criminal Trespass. (R. 310:24-R. 311: I).

In April 2017, Mr. Tanner's

son moved to-FranGe. (R. 266:15-19).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial counsel. provided adequate representation at pre-trial and trial stages of this
case. While Appellant asserts that trial counsel's failure to file a Motion to Dismiss for
unconstitutional delay constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant fails to
overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel acted reasonably. Further, Appellant
fails to demonstrate prejudice resulted from trial counsel's deficiency.
Appellant requests this Court reverse her conviction under a speedy trial violation
claim. The Court should deny plenary consideration of this claim.
~

Appellant does not

6 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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present this Court with an adequate record of proceedings at the justice court. Absent an
adequate record of the proceedings, the Court cannot properly review the speedy trial
claim and the Court should assume regularity in the proceedings.
However, if the Court reaches the merits of the speedy trial claim, and balances
the Barker factors, 1 the Court should deny Appellant's claim. Appellant delayed the case
multiple times and for extended periods of time. These delays were due to her nonappearance at court hearings, and the requests of her trial counsel to continue the matter
rather than see a warrant issue; and her involvement in the setting· of the· ·trial. 2 Appellant
cannot establish in the record that she asserted her right to a speedy trial. Even if she
could, Appellant waived that right based on heractions. 3 ,While Appellant claims that she
was prejudiced by the unavailability of a witness, the dismissal and re-filing did not cause
that result. Rather, the record establishes that the adverse witness1became unavailable at
least two (2) months prior to the City's dismissal.
Last, the Appellant raises a sufficiency of evidence claim against the jury's
verdict.

The record contains evidence sufficient to support conviction under three

theories of trespass. First, that the defendant entered the dwelling unlawfully, and was
1

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (adopted by
Utah in State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1385-86 (Utah 1986)) Factors: (1) the length of
delay, (2) the reason for the delay or delays, (3) the defendant's assertion of her speedy
trial right, and (4) prejudice res1:1Its from delay.
2
While not a part of the record, the justice court audio recording from the March 13, 2017
pre-trial conference records the Appellant objecting to a trial setting in May 2017, and
consenting, without objection, to the date of June 5, 2017.
3
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S at 529 (holding"[ w]e hardly need add that if delay is
attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver
doctrine, the demand rule aside.")
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 7Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reckless as to whether that entry would create fear for the safety of another. Second, that
the defendant, knowing her presence in the home was unlawful, remained in the home
after notice against remaining was provided through personal communication by the
home owner. Third, that the defendant, knowing her entry or presence in the home was
unlawful, entered or remained when notice was provided by fencing or other enclosure
designed to prevent intruders.
The jury, acting as a fact-finder, has the prerogative to believe or not believe any
testimony or evidence presented.

The jury has the ability, and duty, to weigh the

credibility of witnesses and evidence. Here, the jury apparently chose to give more
credibility to the testimony of Mr. Johnny Tanner over that of the Appellant and her
brother. The decision to believe the testimony of one witness over others does not mean
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction.
Moreover, Appellant asks this Court to apply an overly narrow interpretation of
the term enclosure, which would yield an absurd result. The exterior walls of a dwelling
are clearly designed to exclude intruders. Appellant's argument would result in the Court
providing dwellings a lesser right of privacy than that of a fenced off parcel of
unimproved land.
As Appellant merely renews arguments made at trial, Appellant fails to overcome
the broad deference owed to the jury's verdict. Appellant neglects to "marshal all the
~

evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it
in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law8Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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findings." As such, Appellant fails to carry her burden and this Court should affirm the
conviction.
ARGUMENT

I.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE A RULE 25 MOTION TO
DISMISS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
Appellant fails to establish that trial counsel's decision not to file a Motion to

Dismiss for unconstitutional delay was ineffective assistance of counsel. Only when an
attorney's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgement and ·that deficient performance results in prejudice will the court find
ineffective assjstance of counsel. State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88,

,r 14, 361

P.3d 104. · The

Appellant must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id.

Here, trial counsel's

decision "not to pursue a futile motion" was "sound trial strategy."

Id.

As such,

Appellant "cannot satisfy [her] burden of demonstrating the counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." Id.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 25 provides the grounds for a Motion to Dismiss
for unconstitutional delay. To prevail on the motion, trial counsel would have to evaluate
the Barker balancing factors 5 and determine that they weighed in favor of dismissal.

4

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738. (adopting the "marshal the evidence" standard in
criminal appeals challenged a jury verdict for sufficiency of evidence.)
5
( 1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay or delays in the case, (3) the assertion
of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the identification of prejudice resulting from the
delay. State v. MacNeill, 2012 UT App. 263, tjJ 24,286 P.3d 1278.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law9Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

1..:1

When weighing the decision to file the motion, trial counsel would have known that the
Appellant was primarily responsible for multiple delays; failed to appear on multiple
Gi)

occasions; never asserted her speedy trial right; the "material witness" became
unavailable prior to the dismissal and refiling; and the "material witness" would be
hostile to his client. 6 Given these considerations, trial counsel reasonably believed that
the Motion to Dismiss was futile. The decision not to file a futile motion is reasonable
trial strategy. As such, the decision not to file the motion is not deficient performance.
Further, trial counsel's decision did not result in prejudice. Appellant asserts that
she was prejudiced due to her inability to present the testimony of an unavailable witness.
(Appellant Brief p.18). Appellant neglects to recognize that the witness was unavailable
before the first trial, due to her previotJ.s efforts to delay the case: The City's voluntary

dismissal and re-filing did not result in the witness becoming unavailable. Further, this
witness's testimony would have been hostile to Appellant. (Appellant Brief Addendum
#3).

This witness's testimony was never admitted into evidence, but it would have

corroborated the testimony of Mr. Johnny Tanner, which incriminated the Appellant.
The unavailability of incriminating testimony does not result in prejudice for the
defendant, if anything; it is a boon the defendant. 7 As such, Appellant fails to establish
that trial counsel's performance resulted in actual prejudice.

~

6

A more in-depth Barker analysis is provided in Section III of the argument.
State v. Tra{ny, 799 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990) recognizing that delay "may work to the
accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the
commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their

1

@
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II.

APPELLANT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE RECORD AND SUFFICIENTLY
BRIEF HER SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM
This Court will not give plenary consideration of a speedy trial violation when an

appellant fails "to discuss the length of and reason for each circumstance of delay." State
v. MacNeill, 2012 UT App. at ,r 24. To properly analyze a speedy trial violation claim,
the appellate court "must examine the length of each delay that occurred during the
pertinent time period and the reason for the delay." State v. Steele, 20 IO UT App 185, ,r
47, 236 P.3d 161. However, this analysis is impossible where the appellant fails to
provide "the appellate court with the parts of the record that are central to the
determination of the appeal." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,

,r 10,

194 P.3d 903. Without

an adequate record, the appellate court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings

~

below." Steele, 2010 UT App at ,r 47.
In Steele, the court refused to reach the merits of a speedy trial violation claim
when the appellant failed to provide the necessary record and analysis. 2010 UT App at if
47. There, the State filed an Information, charging defendant, in December of 2003. Id.
at

,r 38.

However, the State voluntarily dismissed the case in January 2007. Id. The

State re-filed the case in March 2007. Id. The defendant went to trial in rebruary 2009.

Id.

On appeal, defendant argued that he was subjected to a "presumptively prejudicial"

delay where there was a five-year delay. Id. at ,r 45. However, defendant did not provide
the record from the proceedings of the first filing. Id. at ,r 4 7.
~

memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened,
sometimes seriously so."
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While the court recognized that a "five-year delay is an inordinate amount of time
to wait for trial," the court questioned the inclusion of time between the "the first filing ..
. until [the first filing's] dismissal." Id. at ii 45. The court noted that "[d]efendant cite[d]
to no legal authority in support of his position that the time between the first filing and
dismissal must be considered under a speedy trial analysis." Id. at ,r 46.
More importantly, the court noted that the "[d]efendant.failed to analyze the length
and reason for each individual delay." Id. The court characterized this type of analysis
as "little more than an assertion that the five-year delay is presumptively prejudicial." Id.
Further, the court noted that ''the proceedings from the first filing part of the record" were
not before the court. Id.. at ,r 4 7. As such, the court was unable to "examine the length of
each delay that occurred during the pertinent time period and the reason for the delay."
Id.

Without that record and analysis, the court could not "reach the merits of

[d]efendant's speedy trial issue." Id.
Here, Appellant's speedy trial claim mirrors that in Steele. The :appeal merely
asserts-that a "delay: of 18 months is unreasonable." (Appellant's Brief p. 14). As in

Steele, the appellant "cites to no legal authority to support [her] position that the time
between the first filing and dismissal must be considered under a speedy trial analysis."
2010 UT App. at

if

46. In fact, the appellant's assertion of a "delay of 18 months"

includes the period of time between the dismissal and re-filing of the case. 8

8

The Court does not consider the time between dismissal and re-filing into a speedy trial
violation analysis. MacNeill, 2012 UT App at ,r 24 ..
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The appellant provides no calculation of time between filings, dismissal, and trial.
Appellant provides neither the record nor the analysis of the reasons for the delays in the
justice court. The appellant provides only a printout of the scheduled hearings in the
justice court (Appellant's Addendum #2). That addendum is extent of the record from
the justice court regarding the disposition timeframe. While that is more than what the
court had before it in the Steele case, it is insufficient for a proper speedy trial violation
analysis.
Addendum 2 does not provide the "reasons for the delay.'' Instead, Appellant
asserts, without citation, that "[e]xcept for a one month delay in the original case, all the
other continuances and delays are solely the responsibility of the City." (Appellant's
Brief p.15). Had the appellant provided the proper record, the Court would have more
than bare assertions.
~

This Court is unable to "examine the length of each delay that occurred during the
pertinent time period and the reason for the delay." Steele, 2010 UT App. at ,r 47. "An
appellate court is not a depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument
and research." Id. at

,r 46 (citing Allen v.

Friel, 2008 UT at

,r 9.).

Where Appellant has

wholly neglected the record and argument sufficient to analyze the length of each delay,
this Court should assume the regularity of the proceedings below and decline to reach the
merits of Appellant's speedy trial claim.
~
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III. NO SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION OCCURRED, AS THE BARKER
FACTORS WEIGH AGAINST APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT.
When weighing the Barker factors, this Court should hold that the City's decision to
dismiss and refile in the district court does not violate Appellant's speedy trial right. The
Barker factors are balancing test, used by the courts on an ad hoc basis. State v. Trafnv

799 P.2d at 706. When assessing a speedy trial right claim, the court balances: (1) length
of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4)
prejudice resulting from delay. Id.
Here, Appellant asserts that the case was delayed 18 months, she fails to acknowledge
her own delays. Upon a closer inspection, the period of 18 months is not "presumptively
prejudicial." The City's voluntary dismissal and re-filing occurred after multiple delays
by the Appellant. Appellant's del<;ty~ constitute approximately three-fourths of the lif~ of
the case in the justice court. Further, Appellant fails to establish that she asserted her
right to a speedy trial. Even if she had, her multiple continuances and failures to appear
constitute waiver of that right.

Last, Appellant fails to demonstrate that the City's

dismissal and re-filing resulted in prejudice.

It is important to note that "[t]he primary purpose of the right to a speedy trial is not
~

to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by the passage of time but rather to minimize
the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial." State v. MacNeill, 2012 UT at 124
(quoting US. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982)

~

(internal quotations omitted). Here, the Appellant was never incarcerated, she was cited.
(R. l ).
~

Appellant seeks relief, where the Barker factors weigh heavily against her
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~

argument for a speedy trial right violation. This Court should deny Appellant's claim-and
affirm the conviction.
A. Appellant is Primarily Responsible for the Majority of Delays and Length of
Delay.

~

Appellant asserts that "except for a one month delay in the original case, all the other
continuances or delays are solely the responsibility of the city." (Appellant's Brief p.15)
However, when the proper record is presented, it is clear that the appellant was the
primary factor causing the majority of the delay in the case. To illustrate that the bare
assertions fail to properly characterize the timeframe, the City has marshaled certified
copies of the hearing dates in the justice court, which are attached as addendum and
prepared the following table, showing each of the hearings in the justice court.
..

Tirrieline to-Disposition - Original Filing in the Orem Justice C6urf
Dat~

..

Hearing

Action Taken

I

!
!

July 12; 2016

Defendant signs a promise to
appear for Arraignment,
scheduled for August 3, 2016.

i
I

!
!

..

Party
Requesting
Delay.

22 days

Defendant/
Court

47 days

Defendant/
Court

I

City files Information with the
Orem Justice Court.

,

Length
of Delay

I

June 17, 2016

.

I

August 3,
2016

. Defendant appointed defense
counsel, schedules pre-trial
conference on September 19,
2016.

ARR

'
i

-·

-----•-- - - - -

·----

--------

---

-~----------

----------.

·--------

\ September 19, PTC
:2016

Defendant requests continuance of 44 days
PTC, rescheduled to November 2,
2016.

! November,

Defendant fails to appear, trial
counsel requests continuance.

Defendant

..

:2016
-·-.

2,

PTC

---------

40 days

----
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Defendant

~

Timeline to Disposition - Original Filing in the Orem Jifstice·Court
PTC

Defendant fails to appear, notice
to be sent to Defendant.

91 days

Defendant

i March 13,
l 2017

PTC

Defendant appears, sets matter for 84 days
trial on June 5, 2017.

Defendant

! June 5, 2017

Trial Date City filed Motion to Dismiss,
stating matter would be re-filed in
the Fourth District Court.

December 2,
:2016
I

:
;

City

Appellant requested continuances of the case and failed to appear on multiple
occasions. For example, the appellant did not appear in court for a period of 175 days (5
months and 22 days). When the appellant requested a trial, the justice court provided an
earlier date, but she objected and scheduled the trial an additional 84 days from the pretrial date, June 5, 2017. When taken as a whole, Appellant delayed the prosecution of
this case from September 19, 2016 to the delayed trial date of June 5, 2017, a period of
~

259 days (8 months and 17 days.).
On June 5, 2017, the City dismissed and re-filed the matter in the district court.
As the underlying offense is a class A misdemeanor, the district court was the court of
competent jurisdiction, not a justice court. 9 As such, the dismissal and re-filing was not
an effort to buy more time to prepare. Moreover, at the time of the dismissal, the City

~

had never requested a continuance nor been the cause of any delay. As such, this factor
weighs in favor of the City's action.

9

See Utah Code 78A-5-102, 78A-7-106.
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B. Defendant Never Asserted Her Right to a Speedy Trial.
"Failure by a defendant to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial." State v. Corneio, 2006 UT App. 215,

iJ 32,

138

P.3d 97. Here, Appellant provides no citation to the record where she asserted her right
to a speedy trial. (Appellant's Brief p. 12:35, 40.) Rather, Appellant refers to "Exhibit
A" and "R.24-25."

The City is unaware of any "Exhibit A."

"R.24-25" does hot

establish that the Appellant asserted her "right to a speedy trial."

Rather, it merely

established that the Appellant requested that the matter be scheduled for trial on
December 12, 2017. That request was for a trial 2 months and 7 days in the future. This
request for trial occurred after the City's re-filing, a failure to appear by the defendant,
and a request to set the matter to a waiver hearing by the defendant. Even if she had
asserted her speedy trial right, her actions throughout the both proceedings clearly show
waiver of that right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 529 (holding "[w ]e hardly need add
that if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under
standard waiver doctrine, the demand rule aside."

C. No Prejudice Caused by City's Delay
Appellant fails to establish any prejudice caused by City's delay.

In order to

prevail in speedy trial claim, the appellant must show that prejudice resulted from the
delay. Corneio, 2006 UT App at ,I33. "Prejudice should be evaluated in light of three
concerns: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired."
Id. Claims of "anxiety and concern suffered by [a defendant] are vitiated by his failure to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law17
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seek prompt disposition of his case." Id. at 1 34 (quoting State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440,
443 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).

A defendant must at least "indicate that· his ability to

effectively defend himself was and would be compromised by the delay." Id. (quoting
State v. Maestas, 815 P .2d at 1322).
Here, Appellant does not assert that ~he incarcerated. Rather, she alleges that she
was prejudicially subjected to "living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often
hostility." (Appellant's Brief p. 15). However, it is clear from the minutes of the justice
court that the Appellant requested each continuance of the case, failed to appear, and set
the trial ·on the date of her choosing. Moreover, once the case was re-filed in the district
court, Appellant failed to appear on multiple occasions, requested at least one
continuance, and set the trial on the date of her choosing. Her failure to seek a prompt
disposition of her case vitiates her claims of anxiety and concern.
Last, Appellant alleges "the unavailable witness left.the country-after the first trial
was to take place.''

(Appellant's Brief p.18).

However, the facts establish that the

"material witness" became unavailable prior the first trial. Appellant acknowledges that
this witness "left the country a few months before the first trial." (Appellant's Brief
p.16). While the Court does not have an exact date in the record, it is apparent that the
witness left for France around April 2017. 10 (R.266:15-21). The unavailability of the
witness was not caused by the City's dismissal/re-filing.
~

Rather, it was caused by

Appellant's multiple continuances and failures to appear in Court. The City never sought
10

Trial was held on December 6, 2017, Witness's father testified that his son had been in
France for "[a]lmost eight months".
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a single continuance or caused a single delay prior to June 5, 2017, by which time the
witness was.already out of the country and unavailable to testify.
In sum, the Court should hold that the prejudice claimed by Appellant was not the
result of the City's dismissal and re-filing. Rather, the claims of witness unavailability
and anxiety are the result of Appellant's multiple continuances, failures to appear, and
her indifference to requesting prompt hearings. As such, this claim should be rejected.
IV.

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT A REASONABLE
JURY COULD FIND THAT THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME HAD BEEN
PR.OVEN BEYOND A,REASONABLE.DOUBT.

The verdict of a jury· is given great deference and should only be reversed "when
the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."

State v.

Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ,r 10, 2 P.3d 954 (quotations and citation omitted.) When
considering a sufficiency challenge, the Court must view the evidence "in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict." Id. It is the "exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
evidence and to determine credibility of the witnesses. So long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, [an appellate court's] inquiry stops." State v. Boyd, 2001
UT 30,

iJ 16, 25 P.3d 985 (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)).

(Emphasis in original).
The record contains evidence sufficient to support a conviction of trespass under
three separate theories. (R.420:6-23 ). First, that she entered property unlawfully and was
reckless as to whether her presence will cause fear for the safety of another. (R:420:3-8).
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4w

Second, that once inside the she was given notice to leave by Mr. Johnny Tanner and then
did not leave.

(R. 420:15-23).

Third, that the front door of the home acted as an

enclosure, providing notice that entry is unlawful. (R. 420:8-13). Further, the jury was
instructed on each of these theories. (R. 89-93). While Appellant fails to adequately
marshal evidence to support the conviction, even the evidence marshaled by Appellant
provides "some evidence and reasonable inferences [to] support the jury's findings."

State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App. 434, ~ 16, 124 P.3d 259.

A. Evidence Supports Reasonable Inference that Defend ant was Reckless of the
Probability that Her Unlawful Entry Would Cause One to Fear.
A person acts recklessly when "with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur."
~

Utah Code 76-2-103(3). Appellant argues that criminal liability for trespass only exists
when "an individual was reckless as to whether her presence will cause fear." (Def. Brief
p.24, emphasis in original). Appellant misplaces the emphasis on "will" and ignores that
reckless is the perception of risk and the disregard of that risk. The proper reading of the
trespass statute would acknowledge the risk of creating fear, but acting anyway. 11 That

.:tlJ

reading is mirrored in Jury Instruction 30. (R. 91 ).
The jury has the province to determine witness credibility. State v. Garcia-Meiia,
2017 UT App at~ 22. The jury is tasked with fact-finding, the jury was free to believe or
not believe any evidence, that the jury chose to believe Mr. Tanner's testimony over the
11

Model Utah Jury Instruction, 2nd, Criminal Instruction 304(A), 304(8), and 304(C).
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testimony of the Appellant -and her brother "does not mean that the [Appellant's]
conviction is unsupported by evidence." Id. at

,r 24.

(citing State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d

190, 192 (Utah 1976).
Here, evidence, including reasonable inferences, supports the conclusion that
Appellant's entry into the Tanner residence was reckless. Mr. Tanner's son answered the
front door of their home, after a knock at the door. (R. 268-69). A male entered the
home and immediately started swinging punches at [his] son. (R. 271: 17-18). The male
was "double the size" of Mr. Tanner's ,son. (R. 300: 1). 'f.here was •no warning to this
assault. (R. 273: 1). The assault quickly entered deep into the home, ending up in the
kitchen/dining room area. (R. 272:5-8, R. 274: 16-17). The unknown male assailant was
on-top of Mr. Tanner's son, on the ground, and the male is continued to assault Mr.
Tanner's son. (R. 276:20-24). As Mr. Tanner pulled the unknown assailant off his son,
he becomes aware of a second unknown person in his home pulling at him. (R. 277-78.)
This second unknown person was identified as Appellant. (R. 287). After this assault,
and having two unknown individuals in his home, Mr. Tanner was concerned for his
safety, the safety of his son, and the safety of his family if they returned in that moment.
(R. 278: 19-24, R. 300:9-18). Appellant, on cross-examination, acknowledges that under

these circumstances "a reasonable person would have fear, having two individuals now in
their home." (R. 348: 19-24). Appellant acknowledged that she observed the fight enter
the home. (R. 336:22-25).
Most of Appellant's testimony is in direct controversy with the testimony of Mr.
Tanner. However, the jury has the prerogative "to choose what evidence it will believe."
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Kazda, 545 P.2d at 192. In this case, the jury chose to believe the testimony of Mr.
Tanner over Appellant and her brother. The testimony of Mr. Tanner, and reasonable
inferences based on the testimony, support a conclusion that Appellant acted recklessly
by entering into the Tanner ·home during a forcible felony. As such, this Court should
affirm the jury's verdict.

B. Evidence Supports Conviction Under Notice by Personal Communication.
The City provided evidence that Defendant knew that her presence was unlawful
and notice was given by "personal communication to the person by the owner." Utah
Code 76-6-206(2)(b )(i). Appellant provided no marshaling of evidence under this theory
of the case. Yet, this theory was supported by evidence and argued in closing by the City
and trial counsel. (R: 420-421, R:407-408). Absent proper marshaling of evidence, the
Appellant cannot carry her burden and the Court should affirm the jury's verdict.
The evidence presented at trial provides a sufficient basis for the jury to convict
Appellant. Once Mr. Tanner had stopped the assault, he wanted to get the two unknown
individuals out of his home. (R. 278: 19-14). Appellant was quite loud and boisterous.
(R. 278:23). Mr. Tanner and Appellant "had words." (R. 278:24). Mr. Tanner had to
forcefully push them out of his home. (R. 279: 12-24). For some time, 30-45 seconds,
Appellant engaged in an argument with Mr. Tanner in the dining room of the Tanner
home. (R. 298:7-23). Mr. Tanner asked Appellant to leave the home. (R. 302 8-12).
After being ordered to leave the home, Appellant remained in the home, exchanging
words with Mr. Tanner. (R. 298: 15-19). Appellant continued to exchange words with
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Mr. Tanner, while he moved the group from the back of the home out the front door. (R.
302:3-12). Mr. Tanner's testimony is corroborated by his statement. (Ex. 9).
Again, the jury has the prerogative to believe Mr. Tanner's testimony over that of
Appellant and her brother. That the jury believed that Mr. Tanner asked, ordered, and
threatened Appellant and her brother to leave his home, had to push the group out of his
home, after ordering them to leave, would provide reasonable evidence and inferences
that Appellant .knowing her presence was unlawful, remained after receiving personal
communication to leave the property. Utah Code 76-6-206(2)(b)(i). As such, the Court
should affirm the jury's verdict.

C. Evidence Supports Conviction Under Notice by Enclosure
A front door a home is an enclosure "obviously designed to exclude intruders."
Utah Code 76-6-206(b)(ii). The City provided evidence that Appellant entered the home,
crossing the threshold of the home, through the front door of the home. Appellant knew
she did not have permission to enter, but entered the dwelling, regardless of that fact.
While Appellant argues that a front door of a home is not an enclosure, such a statutory
construction would create an absurd result. This Court should recognize that a habitation
carries a higher right of privacy. Common experience and societal norms provide that
one should seek permission to enter, rather than just entering. As such, the exterior walls
of a dwelling - including windows and doors - are enclosures, which inherently provide
notice that entry is forbidden.
Appellant argues that enclosure is modified by the word fence. (Def. Brief p.26,
citing Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983)). While the City agrees
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with the statutory construction of ejusdem generis, the City disagrees with how Appellant
attempts to apply the canon. A fence is defined as "a barrier intended to prevent escape

<i

or intrusion or to mark a boundary, [or] an immaterial barrier or boundary line."
Merriam-Webster On-Line Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fence. An
enclosure is generally defined as "Land surrounded by some visible obstruction, [or] An
artificial fence around one's estate." Black's Law Dictionary 8th Ed. p.568 (2004).
The exterior wall of a dwelling is analogous to "fencing or other enclosure

V,

obviously designed to exclude intruders." Utah Code 76-6-206(2)(b )(iii). The inside of
one's dwelling is surrounded by exterior walls. These walls are designed to exclude
intruders, much like a fence or wall surrounding the exterior real property of one's estate.
The simple fact of having_ a gate in a fence does not negate the purpose to exclude
intruders. Rather, th~~:~atetallciw.sJ:aw{ul admitt~nce onto the land. A door or window,

~

which provides ingress and egress, does· not .negate the purpose of a wall - excluding
entry of intruders - rather, it allows for the owner to control entry into his home.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that the exterior walls of a dwelling function
to provide notice to potential intruders that permission to enter is necessary. 12 Absent the
inherent notice that the exterior of a home provides "there would be no need to include a
doorbell, knocker, or even a lock in a home." Salazar v. State, 284 S.W.3d at 877. If the
Court were to accept Appellant's argument, the Court would provide greater protection to
a fenced unimproved parcel than the interior of dwelling. An intruder's presence in the
12

Salazar v. State, 284 S.W.3d 874 {Tex. Crim. App. 2009), State v. Harper, 303 Ga. 144
(Ga. 2018), Munns v. State, 412 S.W.3d 95 {Tex. App. 2013).
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fenced parcel would be unlawful, but an intruder's presence inside a home would not,
without additional intent. Such a result would hold that a person would have a greater
expectation of privacy in a fenced parcel than a person would have in their home. That
would work an absurd result, and as such, should be declined by this Court.
CONCLUSION

Appellant's trial counsel provided adequate representation throughout the
proceedings below. Appellant suffered no prejudice, which resulted from trial counsel's
performance. The jury's verdict is supported by evidence, and reasonable inferences, on
multiple theories. As ·such, this Court should affirm Appellant's conviction.

DATED this 11 th day of October, 2018.

D. aco Sum
Orem City Prosecutor
Attorney for Appellee
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Certified Documents from the Orem Justice Court
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•
•

6/16/20 I 6
7/1/2016. 9:30 a.m.

CITY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•

•

DATE FILED
ARR. DATE

D Jacob Summers, Bar No. 12253
Orem City Prosecutor
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 229-7097

INFORMATION

CITY OF OREM,
On Behalf of the State of Utah ,
P laintiff,
vs.

Case No.:
Citation No.: C145748018
OTNNo.:
Defendant

T he undersigned Officer under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the crime(s) of:
CRIMINAL TRESPASS, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-206, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953,
as amended), in that on or about May 29, 2016, in Orem, Utah County, Utah, the defendant did enter or remain
unlawfully on property and is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness:
Officer David Grazzini (3J357)
Orem Police Department

Isl D Jacob Summers
Orem City Prosecutor
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·- ·...:...;.,;,

City 9f Orem Justice Court
97 E Center Street, Orem, UT 84057
(801) 724-3900

Promise to Appear

ICITY OF OREM I vs.le
.__H_A_T_W_IN_ _ _ __ __ __.I IBRIDGETTE MARIE
Last Name

First Name

I, the und~rsigned. promise to appear in court for a(n)IL..a_rr_a....;ig::....n_m_e_n_t;:============v~J

vi

on lwed: Aug 3, 2016
in Court Fioom fl

□

at 19:30 AM

vi

-"I

before Judge IP_a_r_ki_n
....
_ __ _

at the address listed above.

I understand that failure to appear will result in the issuance of a Bench
Warrant for my arrest, and the court may proceed in my absence.

!Tue.Jul 12. 2016
Date

Signature

Case [161900655
Citation [
'
- ~::
:
_-_-_-_
- _-- ~ --_

_J~

~

Clerk [~_B_ _ __ _
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•

Th e Ord e r· o f th e Co urt is stated be low:

Dated: August 03, 2016
0I: 15:56 PM

•

Al the di_r ~c_troncP, f:
/s/ Recd Par$nA'
<'"':l:-/·~~-.,
:•_• ~ -< . ;
Justice Co~Jir.
d ge '
·._ ......;-..t.-.-;·.:.:,
. .,;,,_:::_-·- f· '

by

/s/ ANDREW SI:TTTh1WA Y
Justice Court Clerk

OREM CITY JUSTICE COURT
UTAH COUNTY, ST~TE OP UTAH

OREM CITY,

MINUTES
Pla intiff,

ARRAIGNMENT
NOT I CE

vs .

Case No : 161900655 MO

BRIDGETTE MARIE CHATWIN,

Judge :

REED PARKIN

Date :

August 3 ' 2016

Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk :

a ndrev.s

Prosecutor: MCKNIGHT, AARON R
Defenda nt

•

Defendant prose
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of b i rth: J uly 29, 199 6
Audio

•

Tape Co unt: 10 : 34

CHARGES
1 . CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Clas s B Mi sdemeanor
Pl ea: Not Guilty
ARRAIGNMENT
A copy of the I~forrnation i s g iven t o t he defenda nt .
The Informat i o n is re a d.
Advised o f r i ghts and p e n alties .
The def e nda nt i s advi sed o f right to c ounsel .
Defe ndan t is a r raigne d.

HEARI NG

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Printed : 08/03/:6 13 : 15 : 55
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Case No: 161900655 Date:

Aug 03, 2016

Court orders defendant to pay a recoupment fee of $50.

ii
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints GRANT C NAGAMATSU to represent the
defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name: GRANT C NAGAMATSU
Address: 97 E CENTER ST
City: OREM UT 84059
Phone:

(80) 372-8622

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 09/1~/2016
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Before Judge: REED PARKIN

Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and
services) shoulc call at three days prior to the hearing.
Relay at 800-346-4128.

For TTY service call Utah

The general information phone number is 801-724-3900.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CITY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT
97 E Center• Orem, Utah 84057 • (801) 724-3900 • Fax: (801) 724-3934 • www.orem.org
I
I
,
Honorable Reed S. Parkin
CITY OF OREM

SENrENCE AND ORDER

VS

CASE#

o{m~. 3,. 20/&

/{.g f/(QQLJSS

ATTORNEY _~I_____....;,.!_ _ _ _ _ __
~earance:
J\rraignment

□ Pre-Trial

□ ~entencing

□ Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

□ Defe~dant failed to appear. Warrant orde~ed with bail set at

$_ _ _ _ _ a Cash o~ly o Cash/bond
. a Forfeit $_ _ _ _ _ to fine/city □ Forf~lt in disposition □ Start bond fgpf'eiture proceedings □ Refund $_ _ _ _ to payor
.
,
~\ /
Attorney.
11
Request for Pubhc Defender □ De_nled ~proved ' □ Recoupment fee $_:JV
___......_ o Retaining private counsel a wdived right to counsel

I

I

Charge(s):
Countl_~__._.i.Cf-lL..f-4~~.._..~::..!-JIG.Jr<ll+-4~.n.at::::;.__ __

a Amended _ _ _ _ _ _...;.-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jail days _ _ _ _ ~uspended _ _ _ _ Fine $_ _ _ __

Count 2

o Amended _ _ _ _ _ _....;..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
a Guilty

o No Contest

Jail days _ _ _ _ ~uspended _ _ __;.. Fine$_ _ __

o Dismissed

Count 3

~

·

a Guilty

o No Contest

a Not Guilty

□

Dismissed

a Guilty

o No Contest o Not Guilty

o

Dismissed

□ Amended _ _ _ _ _ _. . . ; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Jail days _ _ _ _ ~uspended _ _ _ _ Fine$._ _ _ __
□ Amended
;
Jail days
jsuspended _ _ __;_Fine$_ _ _ __

Count 4

I

Anes and Fees (subject to Interest):
□ Failure to Appear fee of$_ _ _ _ _ .

Tot~I Jail: Days _ _ _Suspended _ __
□

Accident Enhancement fee of$.________

□ Restitution of $_ _ _ _ _to be paid to the court by _ _ _ _ _. Victim: - - - - - - . . . - - - - - - - - \ □ Proof by notarized letter
o Attorney Recoupment □ Other Fee _ _ _ _ _ of$_ _ _ _ _ to be paid to the court by _ _ _ _ _ _ . o Follow payment schedule

Total Fine/Fees $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Pay online at www.Jtcourts.gov/paymentsl
Payments:
,
o Pay in full by_ _ _ _ _ _ ,,,
a Defendant is to make monthly payments of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ beginning _ _ _ _ __, and continue to
pay monthly until fine/fee is paid in full. □ Fine suspen~ed in the amount of$
probation.

conti~I gent upon successful ti ompletlon of terms of
Notify the court within 48 hours of ANY address change

I
I
Probation:
□ Probation for a period of _ _ _ _ months with □ Court □ Supervised by _ _ _ _ _ _
□ Revoked/Reinstated
□ No further violations of Federal, State or local laws du'ring probation period. a Minor traffic offen~es excluded with a valid DL
□ Community service of _ _ _ _ hours to be comP,l~ted by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ through □ Oreri, City o Provided list
□ Community service hours ordered in lieu of' □ _____ day in jail. □ $____....;l_ fine.
a Do not possess or consume any. alcohol or non prescri~ed controlled substances during probation ~eriod.
□ Complete a □ alcohol/substance abuse □ domesticlvlolence evaluation through _ _ _ _ _ _I ~ - - - - - within _ _ _ _ _ days
and complete any recommend~d treatment. Provide proof to the court
□ Complete _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ through · ·
and provide 1proof of completion within _ _ _ _ _ days.

-r----

I

□ Defendant is ordered to install an Ignition Interlock Device on all vehicles registered/driven by the defendant.

□ Other

I

Jall Order:
a Defendant ordered released fr(?m Jail on all counts for;this case. □ Reduce defendant's bail to am9unts listed above in th~ Charge{s) section.
□ Report to the Utah County Jail l?Y _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ _ _and se e _ _ _ _ _ days. □ Concurrent
□ Co1secutive
o Credit for time served Is
'
days □ GPS Monitoring authorize □ Not eligible for GPS Monl~orlng
o Work Diversion authorized. Complete _ _ _ _ hour

..----+----

Contact jail within 48 hours of today's hearing to make arrangements.

I

!

Or~ered by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Judge Reed!s. Parkin

I hereby promise to appear for the hearing listed below• I r
1
Issued for my arrest.
;
Next hearing schedufet:f In open court:
Il

;I

h

if I fail to appear, the Court ~ay proceed in my absr· 11..ce and a warrant may be
a
I_
j C)

q .,,, I

on

~

V

1 --" ~

::,l

at

s, 1)

Defendant's Signature _ _...,.,...::;.,.c.__~"""""'=---------Notlce Is hereby ,given to the defenda~tlthat this case may be appealed upon writte~ request within 30 d~ys of order.

l

Digitized by the HowardI W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

The O rd er of th e C ourt is stated b elow:
Dated: September 21, 20 16
At th e di_,,ff$.~iic,qf:
1.-· • \~~-::.:r.l1~ ;- -~
11:50:58 AM
/s/ Reed Pata0J1'~;;2,i,~
.. . .. E.
. .. \..
Justice ¢m.fi-~~!igb )
by
/s/ CARALEE'C.oEt:ET
Justice Court Clerk

<. :~~:.~t{ ./

OREM CITY JUSTICE COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OREM CITY ,

MINUTES
Plaintiff,

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
NOTICE

vs .

Case No: 161900655 MO

BRIDGETTE MARIE CHATWIN ,

Judge:

REED PARKIN

Date:

September 19 , 2016

Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk :

caraleec

Prosecutor : SUMMERS, DJ
Defendant
Defendant ' s Attorney(s) : NAGAMATSU, GRANT C

1 0
c

f'..:·i/ !i1 ~! this is a true copy of

rn: ona1nal document on file in the
City of Orem Justice Court
Uta
·
·
•

DEFENDANT INFORMATION

oa·

Date of birth: July 29, 1996
Audio
Tape Count : ~ : 30

CHARGES
1 . CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Cl ass B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

~
~

-~~.,. .' :i

......,..7',;-" ,._..,,,.:>:- '(•.
~"'
·>-~ ,,...,,.; . •('\., .
~~.~~--

HEAR ING

Defense counsel requests a continuance.

Court grants that request a n d continues case .

Defendant is ordered to go to the Orem Public Safety bui l ding for fingerpr ints.
PRE - TRIAL CONFERENCE .
Date: ll/0~/2016
Time : 02 : 00 p . m.
Before Judge : hEED PARKI N

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Case No: 1619006~5 Date:

Sep 19, 2016

Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and
services) shoul~ call at three days prior to the hearing.
Relay at 800-34~-4128.

For TTY service call Utah

The general information phone number is 801-724-3900.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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CiTY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT
9 E Center • Orem, Utah 84057

9 (801) 724-3900 • Fax: (801) 724-3934 • www.orem.org
Honorable Reed S. Parkin

CITY OF OREM

SENTENCE AND ORDER

lf'ff¢ 05 5"
ATTORNEY
/'?f}

vs

cAsEn

DATE

--------

Appearance:
□ Arraignment
o Sentencing □ Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
□ Defe da t failed to appear. Warrant ordered with bail set at$_ _ _ _ _ o Cash only o Cash/bond
□ Forfeit $1--____ to fine/city □ Forfeit in disposition □ Start bond forfeiture proceedings o Refund$ _ _ _ _ to payer
Attorney:
Request for Public
fender □ Denied o Approved □ Recoupment fee $_ _ __
o Retaining private counsel o Waived right to counsel
Charge(s):

----"-+-----~---...;_~"-------

□ Amended

----t----------------a No Contest a Not Guilty o Dismissed
----t----------------o No Contest
Not Guilty o Dismissed
Count4 _ _ _ _t----------------Guilty
No Contest o Not Guilty o Dismissed

o Amended

Countl _ _
a Guilty
Count2
0 Guilty
Count3
0 Guilty
□

□

No Contest

□

Not Guilty

Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$ _ _ _ __

o Dismissed

D

□

□

Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __
Amended
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __

□ Amended

Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __

Total Jail: Days _ _ _Suspended _ _ __
Fines and Fees (su 'ect to interest):
Failure to Appear fee of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ . o Accident Enhancement fee of$ _ _ _ _ __
o Restitution of $_____to be paid to the court by _ _ _ _ _. Victim: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ □ Proof by notarized letter
□ Attorney Recoup ent □ Other Fee _ _ _ _ _ of$ _ _ _ _ _ to be paid to the court by
. □ Follow payment schedule

□

Total Fine/Fees $_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Pay online at www.utcourts.gov/payments
Payments:
□ Pay in full by_______
a .Defendant is to make monthly payments of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ beginning _ _ _ _ __. and continue to
pay monthly until f ne/fee is paid in full. □ Fine suspended in the amount of$
contingent upon successful completion of terms of
probation.
Notify the court within 48 hours of ANY address change
Probation:
o Probation for a p riod of _ _ _ _ months with o Court o Supervised b y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ o Revoked/Reinstated
o No further violat ons of Federal; State or local laws during probation period. □ Minor traffic offenses excluded with a valid DL
□ Community servi e of _ _ _ _ hours to be completed by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ through o Orem City o Provided List
□ Comm nity service hours ordered in lieu of o _____ day in jail. o $_ _ _ _ _ _ fine.
o Do not possess r consume anv. alcohol or non prescribed controlled substances during probation period.
o Complete a □ al ohol/substance abuse o domestic violence evaluation through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ within ______ days
and complete a y recommended treatment. Provide proof to the court
n Complete _ _....-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and provide proof of completion within _ _ _ _ _ days.
□

Defendant is or ered to install an Ignition Interlock Device on all vehicles registered/driven by the defendant.

o Other _ _ _- + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Jail Order:

Defendant orde ed released from jail on all counts for this case. □ Reduce defendant's bail to amounts listed above in the Charge(s) section.
_ _ _ _ _ _and serve _ _ _ _ _ _ days. □ Concurrent □ Consecutive
Report to the U h County Jail !:>y _ _ __
o Credit for time s rved is ____ days
horized □ Not eligible for GPS Monitoring
□ Work Diversion uthorized. Complete _ _ __
Contact jail within 48 hours of today's hearing to make arrangements.

□
□

I hereby promise o appear for the hearing listed below. Ir
issued for my arr st.
Next he ring scheduled in open court:

· e that if I fail to appear, the Court may proceed in my absence and a warrant may e

0
--------------- d-~ U
at

a t is case may be appealed upon written request within 30 days of order.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Th e O rder of the Co urt is staled below:
Da ted: Novcmbcr03,20 16
At lh e d.!r~~tiM 1Jlf:..
IsI R ccd Par,,;m"i~
·f} ···•','k-·~
08 :)· 1:4 )" AlM
:\ $-·
Justice Cot!r-~dgc

•

~...."':•:~'

by

.....

Isl

NANCY

··1'~

sr s'6N''

Justice Court Clerk

OREM CITY JUSTICE COURT
UT/\H COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•

OREM CITY,

MINUTES
Plaintiff,

CONTINUANCE
NOTICE

vs .

Case No: 1619 00655 MO

BRIDGETTE MARIE CHATIHN,

Judge :

REED PARKIN

Date:

November 2, 2016

Defendant .

•

PRESENT
Clerk :

nancys

Prosecutor: SUMMERS, DJ
Defendant not present
Defendant ' s Attcrney{s) : NAGAMl\TSU, GRANT C

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth : July 29, 1996

•

Tape Count : ~ . 39

CHARGES
1. CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Class B Misdemeanor

Plea: Not Guil ty

I certify that this is a true copy of
an original document on fit~ in the
City
rem Justice Cou
Uta

Da

--1--,,....,.,,...,

,7? ,

·/':_

li~~ -.1-~

, · -:..~H·•
,:

;

. :·

,r. ,.

CONTINUANCE

.-; .
. ':fil1):..:."J.;·
,,,:

Whose Motion :

•

The Defendant ' s counsel GRANT C Nl\Gl\Ml\TSU .

'

.

~

/

Reason for continuance:
Court Ordered
The motion is g 1 an ted.
PRE-TRIAL CON FERENCE is scheduled.
Da t e : 12/1;/2016
Time : 09 : 1 5 a . m.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Printed : 11/03/16 08:51 : 44

Pagel of. 2

Case No: 161900Q55 Date:

Nov 02, 2016

Before Judge: REED PARKIN

Individuals
needing- special
accommodations
(including
auxiliary communicative aids and
.
..
.
..
.
--. services) should call at three days prior to the hearing. · For TTY service.call Utah
Relay at 800-346-4128. The ~eneral information phone number is 801-724-3900.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

~
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CITY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT

~;

J//

97 E Center n Orem, Utah 84057 • (801} 724-3900 • Fax: (801) 724-3934 • www.orem.org
Honorable Reed S. Parkin

CITY OF OREM

SENTENCE AND ORDER
CASE# _(_6._19._0_(//_6_55
__ DATE

vs

1

It lt11-

//6

ATTORNEY _ _
EJZ.,.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Appearance:
□ Arraignment 'Ate-Trial o Sentencing □ Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Defendant failed to appear. Warrant ordered with bail set at$_ _ _ _ _ □ Cash only o Cash/bond
Forfeit $_____ t.o fine/city o Forfeit in disposition o Start bond forfeiture proceedings □ Refund $_ _ _ _ to payor
Attorne~
·
Request for Public Defender □ Denied □ Approved □ Recoupment fee$____ o Retaining private counsel o Waived right to counsel
Charge(s):
Count 1
□

c.-rrP1r1~
Guilty

Count2
o Guilty

□

No Contest

□

Not Guilty

□

□

Guilty

□

No Contest

□

Not Guilty

o Dismissed

□

Guilty

□

No Contest

□

Not Guilty

□

Dismissed

Count3
Count 4
Dismissed

o Amended
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __
□ Amended
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __
□ Amended
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __
□ Amended
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __

Fines and Fees (subject to interes{):
Total Jail: Days _ _ _Suspended _ __
o Failure to Appear fee of$________ . o Accident Enhancement fee of $_ _ _ _ __
□ Restitution of $_____to be paid to the court by _ _ _ _ _ . Victim: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ o Proof by notarized letter
□ Attorney Recoupment o Other Fee _ _ _ _ _ of$ _ _ _ _ _ to be paid to the court by
. a Follow payment schedule

Total Fine/Fees $_ _ _ _ _ __

Pay online at www.utcourts.gov/payments

Payments:
a Pay in full by_ _ _ _ _ _.
□ Defendant is to make monthly payments of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ beginning _ _ _ _ __, and continue to
pay monthly until fine/fee is paid in full. □ Fine suspended in the amount of$
contingent upon successful completion of terms of
probation.
Notify the court within 48 hours of ANY address change

Jj}

Probation:
□ Probation for a period of _ _ _ _ months with □ Court □ Supervised b y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ □ Revoked/Reinstated
a No further violations of Federal~,State or local laws during probation period. a Minor traffic offenses excluded with a valid DL
a Community service of _ _ _ _ hours to be completed by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ through □ Orem City □ Provided List
a Community service h~urs ordered in lieu of □ _____ day in jail. o $_ _ _ _ _ _ fine.
a Do not possess or consume any alcohol or non prescribed controlled substances during probation period.
□ Complete a a alcohol/substance abuse □ domestic violence evaluation through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ within _ _ _ _ _ days
and complete any recommended treatment. Provide proof to the court
□ Complete
·
through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and provide proof of completion within _ _ _ _ _ days.
□ Defendant is ordered to instal an Ignition Interlock Device on all vehicles registered/driven b

□ Other --------fi~--:-ar--,l---r~---=--.----t---~-t------1<-+--=-i--+---H----::rr-#fl'---+..,.,. l-0.

?/

ft((~
Jail Order:
o Defendant ordered released frq_m jail on all counts for this case. o Reduce defendant's bail to amounts listed above in the Charge(s) section.
□ Report to the Utah County Jail by _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ _ _ and serve _ _ _ _ _ days. □ Concurrent
□ Consecutive
□ Credit for time served is ____ days a GPS Monitoring authorized
ot eligible for GPS Monitoring
□ Work Diversion authorized. Coinplete _ _ _ _ hours by _______,,,,___ Contact jail within 48 hours of today's hearing to make arrangements.

t

I hereby promise to appear for the hearing listed below. I realize that If I fail to appear, the Court may proceed in my abseuce and a warrant may be
issued for my arrest.
(
Neirt hearing scheduled in open court:

~

_

~~

on

J~ /

/],,,

Jft,

at'

/5

Defendant's Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Notice is hereby r,iven to the defendant that this case may be appealed upon written request within 30 days of order.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Th e Order of th e Co urt is stated below:
Dated: January 09, 2017
04 :04:09 PM

by

OREM CITY JUSTICE COURT
UTAH COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH

MINUTES

OREM CITY,

PRE-TRIJ-\L CONFERENCE

PlaintifE,
VS .

Case No : 161900655 MO

BRIDGETTE MARIE CHATWIN ,

J udge :

REED PARKIN

Date :

December 12 , 2016

DeEendant.

PRESENT
Clerk :

andre1,; s

Prosecutor: SUM~ERS , DJ
Defendant not present

DEFENDANT INFORIV•ATION
Date of birth : July 29, 1996
Audio

CHARGES
1 . CRIMINAL TRES.PASS - Class B Misdemeanor

Plea : Not Guilty

I certify that this is a true copy of
an original document on file in the
City of Orem Justice C9urt; - : .
Ut
~~

Da

HEARING

Defendant failed to appear .

New not ice to be sent out .

End OE Order - Signature at the Top oE the Fi rst Page

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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CITY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT
97 E Center• Orem, Utah 84057 • (801} 724-3900 • Fax: (801) 724-3934 • www.orem.org
Honorable Reed S. Parkin

CITY OF OREM

SENTENCE AND ORDER

vs

CASE#

I f/9 (){)0 5$

DATE

12-lll-l/6

ATTORNEY __..._/7t
_____'fJ_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Appearance:
-<.'i'"'/•.':";';!~:~( :;.,'; ·
□ Arraign~nt
,:(fre-Trial o ~entencing o Other · ··· ·--· · ·- ·· · · ·
Defendant failed to appear. Warrant ordered with ball~tiat:$
o Cash only o Cash/bond
orfeit $_ _ _ _ _ to fine/city o Forfeit in di~osition · -o Start bond forfeiture proceedings o Refund$ _ _ _ _ to payer
~
Attorney:

-:.::i·'·:~- •!~'.:/).'.\':_·:~\\;\!·!'.':__

Request for Public Defender □ D~_nied □ Approved □ Recoupment fee$____ o Retaining private counsel o Waived right to counsel
;·::.;;:· ..,

~

Charge{s):
Count 1

GY1/t't.1 I?-,.-,\

□ Amended

o Guilty

□ Dismissed

Count 2
□

Guilty

o No Contest

D

Not Guilty

□

Dismissed

o Guilty

o No Contest

D

Not Guilty

□

Dismissed

Count 3

~

:_.•.:.

Count 4

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __
□ Amended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __
□ Amended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$ _ _ _ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jail days _ _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ _ Fine$_ _ _ __

□ Amended

o Guilty

□

No Contest

□

Not Guilty

□

Dismissed

Fines and Fees (subject to Interest):
Total Jail: Days ____Suspended _ __
□ Failure to Appear fee of$_ _.,...,____ . o Accident Enhancement fee of$ _ _ _ _ __
□ Restitution of $_ _ _ _ _to·be paid to the court by _ _ _ _ _ . Victim: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ □ Proof by notarized letter
□ Attorney Recoupment □ Other: Fee _ _ _ _ _ of$ _ _ _ _ _ to be paid to the court by
□ Follow payment schedule
Total Fine/Fees $_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Pay online at www.utcourts.gov/payments
Payments:
o Pay in full by_______
o Defendant is to make monthly payments of$ _ _ _ _ _ _ beginning _ _ _ _ _...., and continue to
pay monthly until fine/fee is paidtn full. □ Fine suspended in the amount of$
contingent upon successful completion of terms of
probation.
Notify the court within 48 hours of ANY address change
Probation:
o Probation for a period of _____ months with o Court □ Supervised by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ □ Revoked/Reinstated
□ No further violations of Federal, State or local laws during probation period. □ Minor traffic offenses excluded with a valid DL
o Community service of _____ hours to be completed by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ through □ Orem City o Provided list
o Community service hours ordered in lieu of □ _____ day in jail. □ $_ _ _ _ _ _ fine.
o Do not possess or consume any: alcohol or non prescribed controlled substances during probation period.
□ Complete a o alcohol/substance abuse □ domestic violence evaluation through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ within _ _ _ _ _ days
and complete any recommended treatment. Provide proof to the court
o Complete
:
through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and provide proof of completion within _ _ _ _ _ days.
□ Defendant is
ed to install an Ignition Interlock Device on all vehicles registered/driven by the defendant.
o Other
.

0J

Jail Order:
□ Defendant ordered released fr9m jail on all counts for this case. a Reduce defe dant's bail to amounts listed above in the Charge(s) section.
o Report to the Utah County Jail lY _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ _ _ and serve.....,..._____ days. □ Concurrent o Consecutive
o Credit for time served is ____ days □ GPS Monitoring authorized □ No eligible for GPS Monitoring
□ Work Diversion authorized. Complete _ _ _ _ hours by _ _ _-+-,__...,._ Contact jail within 48 hours of today's hearing to make arrangements.
Orqered by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Judge Reed S. Parkin
I hereby promise to appear for t~,e hearing listed below. I realize that if I fail to appear, the Court may proceed in my absence and a warrant may be
issued for my arrest.
Ne~ hearing scheduled in open court: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at _ _ _ _ __

Defendant's Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Notice is hereby given to the defendant that this case may be appealed upon written request within 30 days of order.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T he Ord er of t he Cou r t is stated below :
Dated: March 13 , 2017
At the di_r-~c_tfonJ\(:
0 l: 19:38 PM
Isl llliED ]:'i~( i \:
Justice Co'tli:t:'g:i'.}dge '
by
·\ .
Isl ANDREW,S.Fft:JMWA Y
Justice Court Clerk

·rr~'!~-'~, ./

OREM CITY JUST ICE COURT
UTAH COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH

MINUTES

OREM CITY,

PTC

Plaintiff,

NOTICE
Case No : 161900655 MO
REED PARKIN
Judge :

vs.
BRIDGETTE MARIE CHATWIN,

Date:

Defendant .

March 13, 2017

PRESENT
Clerk :

andrews

Prosecutor : SUMMERS , DJ
Defendant
Defendant ' s Attorney(s)

NAGAMATSU, GRANT C

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 29, 1996
Audio

CHARGES
1 . CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 06/05/2017
Time: 03 : 00 p .m.
Before Judge : REED PARKIN

I ndividuals needing special accommodations (including a uxiliary communicat ive aids and
services) should call at three days prior to the hear ing .
Relay at 800-346-4128 .

For TTY service call Utah

The g e ne ral information phone number is 801-724 - 3900 .

End Of Orde r - Signature a t

t he Top of the First Page
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CITY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT
I
• Otem, Utah 84057 • (801) 724-3900 • Fax: (801) 724-3934 • www.orem.brg
1

Honorable Reed S. Parkin

CITY OF OREM

SENTENCE AND ORDER

I

I

I

CASE# \ la \t1 0 l)(p 5 5

!

DATE __,.__._3.,__/
.
..;:;.....;f~=--/'--\L......:7_

D'-----'---+-1_'- -

ATTORNEY _ _ _·~--=---.. . . .

1
1
Appearance:
r
o Arraignment \:tFre~T~ia □.·sentencing l!l Other____________
Bond/Bail Posted _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
o Defen8~t failcid o appear. Warrant! ordered with bail set at$._ _ _ _ _ _ o Cash only o Cash/bond
□ Forfeit$ i , i
Jto fine/city □ IStart bond forfeiture proceedings o Refund$_ _ _ _ to payor o Exoaeratelbond

I

I

Attorney:
1
I
Request for Public D~fend~r o Denied o Appro;ved

I
□

Recoupment fee$ _ _ __ o Retaining private counsel o Waived right to counsel

i
o Amended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I,
Jail days _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ Fine$. _ _ _ I
Count2

o Guilty

□ Not Guilty

1

□ Dismissed

o Guilty

o Not Guilty !

□ Dismissed

□

o Not Guilty

□

Count3
Count4
Guilty

1

Dismissed

o Amended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jail days _ _ _ Suspended _ _ _ Fine$._ __
□ Amended _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jail days _ _ _· Suspended _ _ _ Fine$._ __
□ Amended
I
Jail days _ _ _ Suspended
Fine$. _ _ _ I

I
Findings:
I
□ Plea entered knowi~gly ap_ voluntarily o Enh;mcement notification given □ City not present □ City present, but yields to the coµrt
1

,

1

,

I

'

I

.
.

I
'

Fines and Fees (subject to i tei·est):
Total Jail: Days _ _ _Susp~nded _ __
□ Failure to Appear
of$~
. o Accident Enhancement fee of$_____
I
1
□ Restitution of$
'. t
be paid to the cou~t by _ _ _ _. Victim: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ o Proof by ntjtarized letter
I
o Attorney Recoupment 'o b eJJ Fee
of$ _ _ _ to be paid to the court by _ _ _ _. o Follow pa.Y"ilent schedule
□ Fine suspended in tl\e am6 , t bf$_ _ _ _ cbntingent upon successful completion of terms of probation.
1
I I !

fer

1

Total Fine Ff;es $______
Pay online at www.utcourts.gov/payments
\
Payments:
I
,
o Pay in full by
• I . □1Defendant is to make monthly payments of$_ _ _ _ _ beginning _ _ _ __,and continue tb pay
monthly until fine/fee lis paip full.
I
i
Notify the court within 48 hours of ANY address change I
,
Probation:
1
□ Probation for a peri9d of ,
months with 1 □ Court □ Supervised b y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ □ Revoked/Reinstated
a No further violations1off ep al, State or local lajNS during probation period. a Minor traffic offenses excluded with a valid driveri's license
□ Community service 9f
,
~- hours to be c9mpleted by _ _ _ _ _ _ through □ United Way □ Orem City o Provided List
o Community servit hours ordered in lieu of o _ _ _ _ day in jail. o $_ _ _ _ fine.
I
o Do not possess or co~sutnJ y alcohol or non p~escribed controlled substances during probation period.
o Complete a □ alcoholf subJ · c:e abuse o dome~tic violence evaluation through _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ within
I days
and complete any retomm1e dP.d treatment. Prtivide proof to the court. Report to agency within _ _ _ _ days to start process.
1
1
□ Complete
·
through' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and provide proof of completion within
: days.
□ Defendant is ordered:to in~ ! I an Ignition lnterl~ck Device on all vehicles registered/driven by the defendant.
o Other
1
1 I
I
1

I

I

Jail Order:
□ Defendant ordered reJea~eq
o Report to the Utah Copnty Jpi
□ Credit for time served is
□ Work Diversion autho,rlz0d;
1

1

~m jail on all coun~s for this case. □ Reduce defendan~'s bail to amounts listed above in the Charge(s1 section.
~•Y _ _ _ _ _ op _ _ _ _ _and serve _ _ _ _ _ days. o Concurrent o Consecutive
r

_ days □ GPS Monitoring authorized o Not eligible for GPS Monitoring
I
qmplcte
~ o
~
Contact /ail within 48 hours of today's hearing to make arrf ngements.

---~-+-:--..L----------- Judge Reed S. Parkin
1

'

.

I

I hereby promise to appea

</7

· the hearing liste<I below. I realize that if I fail to appear, the Court may proceed in my absence and a
warrant may be issuedl for
1rrest.
~
~ /
~ ~ >-Lll
Next hearing scttedule~ ln open court:
D
,T \~ l-- oi:i
at

·
:

· I

Defq,1dant's Signature ,

~

<

@

;_S

f
_~c....,----__

·

.. [
.
---I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Notice is hereby, given Qt> the defendant that this case may be appealed upon written request within 28 days of order. 1
Machine-generated
OCR,
may
contain
errors.
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D Jacob Summers, Bar No. 12253
Orem City Prosecutor
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (80 I) 229-7097
CITY OF OREM JUSTICE COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF OREM,

MOTIO

TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. : 161900655

CHATWIN, Bridgette Marie
433 East Rue De Paris
Vineyard, UT 84058

Judge Recd Parkin
Defendant

DOB: 7129/l996

COMES NOW Plaintiff, City of Orem, by and through its attorney and moves the Cornt to
dismiss without prejudice the charge of Trespass with a violation date of May 29, 20 16, against the
above-named defendant in the above-entitled action. The City will be re-fi ling in District Court.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2017.

Isl D Jacob Summers
Orem City Prosecutor

MAILING CERTIFCCATE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of June, 20 17, [ hand-delivered/mai led a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Motion and Order to Dismiss to the above-named Defendant.

Isl Annelle Adams
Orem City Attorney' s Office

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ADDENJ)UM2
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
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78A-7- l 06. Jurisdiction.
( 1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction by a person
18 years of age or older.
(2) Except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, justice
courts have jurisdiction over the following offenses committed within their territorial
jurisdiction by a person who is 16 or 17 years of age:
(a) class C misdemeanor and infraction violations of Title 53, Chapter 3, Part 2,
Driver Licensing Act; and
(b) class B and C misdemeanor and infraction violations of:
(i) Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah;
(ii) Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act;
(iii) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code;
(iv) Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners
and Operators Act;
(v) Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-Highway Vehicles;
(vi) Title 73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act;
(vii) Title 73, Chapter 18a, Boating - Litter and Pollution Control;
(viii) Title 73, Chapter 18b, Water Safety; and
(ix) Title 73, Chapter 18c, Financial Responsibility of Motorboat Owners and
Operators Act.
(3) As used in this section, "the court's jurisdiction" means the territorial jurisdiction of a
justice court.
(4) An offense is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a justice court if:
(a) conduct constituting an element of the offense or a result constituting an element
of the offense occurs within the court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the
conduct or result is itself unlawful;
(b) either a person committing an offense or a victim of an offense is located within
the court's jurisdiction at the time the offense is committed;
(c) either a cause of injury occurs within the court's jurisdiction or the injury occurs
within the court's jurisdiction;
(d) a person commits any act constituting an element of an inchoate offense within
the court's jurisdiction, including an agreement in a conspiracy;
(e) a person solicits, aids, or abets, or attempts to solicit, aid, or abet another person
in the planning or commission of an offense within the court's jurisdiction;
( t) the investigation of the offense does not readily indicate in which cou11's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(iii..

jurisdiction the offense occurred, and:
(i) the offense is committed upon or in any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or
aircraft passing within the court's jurisdiction;
(ii) (A) the offense is committed on or in any body of water bordering on or
within this state if the territorial limits of the justice court are adjacent to
the body of water; and
(B) as used in Subsection (5)(f)(ii)(A), "body of water" includes any stream,
river, lake, or reservoir, whether natural or man-made;
(iii) a person who commits theft exercises control over the affected property
within the court's jurisdiction; or
(iv) the offense is committed on or near the boundary of the court's jurisdiction;
(g) the offense consists of an unlawful communication that was initiated or received
within the court's jurisdiction; or
(h) jurisdiction is otherwise specifically provided by law.
(5) A justice court judge may transfer a criminal matter in which the defendant is a child
to the juvenile court for further proceedings if the justice court judge determines and
the juvenile court concurs that the best interests of the minor would be served by the
continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court, subject to Section 78A-6-602.
(6) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78A, Chapter 8,
Small Claims Courts, if a defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the justice court.

Amended by Chapter 330, 2017 General Session
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78A-5-l 02. Jurisdiction -- Appeals.
(I) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.

Cw

(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the
rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction over judgments and orders of the justice
court as outlined in Section 78A-7-1 I 8 and small claims appeals filed pursuant to
Section 78A-8- l 06.

(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under
Sections 78A-3-l 02 and 78A-4-l 03.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review:
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that
chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings; and
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7.

(8) Notwithstanding Subsection ( 1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in
class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of
ordinances only if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the
district courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed, or has not
formed and then dissolved~ a justice court; or
(c) they are included in an indictment or infonnation covering a single criminal
episode alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor.
(9) If the district court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (5) or (8), it
also has jurisdiction over offenses listed in Section 78A-7-106 even if those offenses
are committed by a person 16 years of age or older.
( 10) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Child
Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district court.

Amended by Chapter 34, 20 IO General Session
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76-2-103. Definitions.
A person engages in conduct:
(I) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to
a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result
of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result.
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Amended by Chapter 229, 2007 General Session
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76-6-206. Criminal trespass.

(l) As used in this section:
(a) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body or the entire unmanned aircraft.
(b) "Remain unlawfully," as that term relates to an unmanned aircraft, means
remaining on or over private property when:
(i) the private property or any portion of the private property is not open to the
public; and
(ii) the person operating the unmanned aircraft is not otheiwise authorized to fly
the unmanned aircraft over the private property or any portion of the private
property.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting to
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a violation of
Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial obstruction:
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on or causes an unmanned aircraft to
enter and remain unlawfully over property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property,
including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether the person's or unmanned aircraft's presence will
cause fear for the safety of another;
(b) knowing the person's or unmanned aircraft's entry or presence is unlawful, the
person enters or remains on or causes an unmanned aircraft to enter or remain
unlawfully over property to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(c) the person enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(8).
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class 8 misdemeanor unless the
violation is committed in a dwelling, in which event the violation is a class A
misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(c) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
(a) the property was at the time open to the public; and
(b) the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining
on the property.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Amended by Chapter 364, 2017 General Session
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ADDENDUM3
SECONDARY SOURCE LANGUAGE
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MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Second Edition (MUJI 2d)
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CR304A Reckless as to Circumstances Surrounding Conduct or as to Result.
A person acts ''recklessly" w~en [he][she] is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that:
1. certain circumstances exist relating to [his] [her] conduct, but [he] [she] consciously
disregards the risk and acts anyway; or
2. [his] [her] conduct will cause a particular result, but [he] [she] consciously disregards
the risk and acts anyway.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a
gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation.
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission.
References
Utah Code § 76-2-103(3).

~

Amended Dates:
September 2015.

~

CR304B Reckless as to Result.
A person acts "recklessly" when [he] [she] is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that [his] (her] conduct will cause a particular result, but [he] [she] consciously disregards
the risk and acts anyway.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a
gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation.
''Conduct" means either an act or an omission.
References
Utah Code§ 76-2-103(3).
Amended Dates:
September 2015.
CR304C Reckless as to Circumstances Surrounding Conduct.
A person acts "recklessly" when [he] [she] is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that certain circumstances exist relating to [his] [her] conduct, but [he] [she] consciously
disregards the risk and acts anyway.
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is a
gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Conduct" mean~ either an act or an omission.
References
Utah Code § 76-2-103(3).
Amended Dates:
September 2015.
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Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) Dismissing an information. In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance
of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party,
order an information or indictment dismissed.
(b) Mandatory dismissal. The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(b )(I) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
Q,

(b )(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any bill of
particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be
charged in the pleading so filed;
(b )(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the impaneling or in
the proceedings relating to the grand jury;

~

(b )(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(b)(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute oflimitations.
(c) Record of dismissal. The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order
and entered in the minutes.
(d) Effects of dismissal. If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was
unreasonable delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the
proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the offense shall not be
barred and the court may make such orders with respect to the custody of the defendant
pending the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the
defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to trial
or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the
offense charged.
(e) Dismissal by compromise. In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the
court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party.
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or in writing.
The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in the minutes. The order
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; provided however, that
dismissal by compromise shall not be granted when the misdemeanor is committed by or
upon a peace officer while in the performance of duties, or riotously, or with an intent to
commit a felony.
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